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INTRODUCTION 
Modern patent law applies across a vast range of developed, developing, and as yet 
undeveloped technologies. Indeed, the international TRIPS Agreement requires that, with 
only a few exceptions, patent protection is to be available in signatory nations without 
respect to technological field.1 At the same time, modern technologies display a highly 
varied and even disparate set of technical features, economic characteristics, and 
innovation profiles.2 In order to accommodate this diverse array of technologies, patent 
statutes incorporate flexible provisions allowing their application to be modulated to the 
needs of different subject matter categories.3 
And yet, even with such statutory flexibility, some technologies fit only very 
uncomfortably within the ambit of current patent statutes. In particular, recombinant 
DNA technology and computer software have long been the problem children of modern 
patent law.4 For at least the last thirty years, on both sides of the Atlantic, patent doctrine 
has been in a constant state of turmoil regarding these technologies, sometimes accepting 
them, sometimes rejecting them, and almost continually revising itself in unsuccessful 
                                                          
* Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine. 
1 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 27, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS 
Agreement]. 
2 DAN L. BURK & MARK. A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009). 
3 Id. 
4 Dan L. Burk, The Problem of Process in Biotechnology, 43 HOUSTON L. REV. 561, 588 (2006). 
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attempts to accommodate them. This difficulty has been apparent across multiple patent 
doctrines, including disclosure, obviousness, and utility. 
But perhaps the most pronounced difficulties have manifested in attempting to fit 
inventions from these high technology fields reliably, if at all, within the subject matter 
provisions of American and European patent law. Despite a lengthy period of 
consideration and reconsideration, patent authorities in these major jurisdictions have 
generally failed to settle on a solution to the subject matter problems concerning software 
and biotechnology inventions. The law on this question remains in constant flux, 
attempting new formulation every few years, leaving the industries founded on these 
technologies uncertain as to the criteria for patentability in their fields. No stable 
resolution to these issues is currently in sight. 
However, it may be that the extended effort that has gone into considering the 
problem has not been entirely in vain, even if no firm criteria for determining software 
and biotechnology subject matter have yet emerged. Instead, what arguably has emerged 
from thirty years of judicial, legislative, and administrative struggle is the outline of the 
problem that bedevils these technologies. This outline is apparent in examining the 
common threads running not only between decisions regarding these two technologies, 
but among the law developed by adjudicators in different jurisdictions. A comparative 
study of such decisions shows that such institutions have consistently relied upon a 
similar pattern of doctrines, interpretive strategies, and jurisprudential constructs in their 




In tracing the skein of such decisions we must of course be aware of certain 
differences in the contexts of the various decisions regarding patentable subject matter. 
Much of the development of this law in North America has been common law 
development, generated in the courts, either by judicial interpretation of statutes, or from 
entirely judicially created doctrine. The United States Patent Office in particular, has a 
relatively subordinate role in developing the meaning of the patent statute. In Europe, 
only Great Britain follows the common law approach; other national courts are largely 
creatures of civil law. 
Perhaps more important, much of European patent law development emerges 
from the intersection of national laws and interpretation of international treaties. The 
European Patent Office is a treaty organization, with quasi-judicial functions in 
interpreting the language of the European Patent Convention. Separately and 
contiguously, the Court of Justice of the European Union, a different treaty organization, 
assumes responsibility for interpreting the language of European Union directives, as 
well as the compatibility of national laws with the functioning of a common market under 
the relevant community treaties. The language of certain directives has a bearing on the 
development of patent laws, whereas the functioning of national patent laws has a bearing 
on the common market. The interpretive latitude of such bodies is markedly different 
than that of common law courts. 
Additionally, it is important in such comparisons to recognize that these 
treatments of patent law do not develop in isolation. Judges and patent examiners on both 
sides of the Atlantic are well aware of the decisions of their counterparts elsewhere; they 
are in frequent communication and familiar with doctrinal developments in other 
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jurisdictions.5 International treaties lend a measure of harmonization to the patent regime 
in different jurisdictions, or may impose constraints channeling local developments along 
similar courses. Consequently, to the extent that similar patterns of addressing patent 
issues constitute parallel development, it is often conscious parallelism rather than an 
independent convergence. 
Nonetheless, even bearing such caveats in mind, tracing particular patterns across 
jurisdictions can help us triangulate on core issues that exist despite disparate institutional 
and jurisprudential contexts. In examining similar fact patterns from different 
jurisdictions, I will highlight common approaches to common problems, which I will 
argue reveal a fundamental deficiency to be corrected in modern patent law. 
 
I. CATEGORIZING SUBJECT MATTER 
Perhaps the best place to begin tracing the commonalities of treatment in biotechnology 
and software patenting is in North America, with the landmark decision of the Canadian 
Supreme Court in Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents).6 The invention 
at issue in the decision was the so-called “Oncomouse,” a genetically modified rodent 
carrying genetic sequences, called oncogenes, that confer on the animal a greater 
susceptibility to cancer, making it a valuable laboratory model for biomedical research. 
The mouse was the subject of a lengthy patent battle in the European Patent Office; was 
celebrated in the United States as one of the first patents on a genetically modified 
animal; and was the subject of a patent rejection in the Canadian Patent Office, which 
                                                          
5 See PETER DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES AND THEIR CLIENTS 
(2010). 
6 [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45, 2002 SCC 76. 
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contended that such living subject matter was not within the scope of the Canadian patent 
statute. 
That decision was upheld by the Canadian Supreme Court. Over a vigorous 
dissent, the majority of the Court in Harvard College accepted the position of the patent 
office, holding that a living organism was not within the meaning of the subject matter 
provisions of the patent statute. The Canadian patent statute defines patentable subject 
matter as “any new and useful art, process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter.”7 The Court concluded that a living, “higher” organism could not fit the definition 
for any of these categories. In particular, the majority held that the mouse could not be a 
“composition of matter” under the statute, reasoning that the ordinary meaning of this 
term included only inanimate material, not living organisms, or at least, not “higher” 
organisms such as a mouse. And, if the mouse could not be a composition of matter, then 
similarly it surely could not be an art, process, machine, or manufacture, placing it 
outside all the statutory categories. 
One finds a surprising strain of vitalism in this opinion—in considering the proper 
definition of “composition of matter,” the Court dwells on the transcendence of “higher” 
life forms, arguing that the common understanding of “matter” does not capture this 
transcendent quality.8 The court all but argues that the mouse has a soul; at least it asserts 
that the common understanding of the term “matter” would be that it lacks whatever vital 
spark a mouse has. As a consequence, given that a “composition of matter” cannot be 
alive, the Court concluded that only a new act of the legislature—presumably, using a 
                                                          
7 Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, s. 2. 
8 Dan L. Burk, Reflections in a Darkling Glass: A Comparative Contemplation of the Harvard College 
Decision, 40 CAN. BUS. L.J. 219 (2003). 
6 
 
different terminology—could bring genetically modified higher organisms within the 
scope of the statute. 
In other words, the ultimate rationale behind this conclusion was that a particular 
technology, such as genetically modified living subject matter—or at least, multicellular 
genetically modified subject matter—must be within the contemplation of the legislature 
when enacting the statute, rather than within the ambit of the language chosen by the 
legislature. The import of such a holding for patent policy is striking. It effectively means 
that the patentable subject matter canon is closed, reasoning that if the legislature did not 
envision a particular technology when enacting a statute, it can only mean that 
unanticipated innovation is not patentable. According to the majority in Harvard College, 
only if Parliament indicated acceptance of a new category could an invention such as a 
genetically modified mouse become eligible for patenting. 
As I have pointed out in previous work9, this result is particularly striking because 
two decades earlier, the US Supreme Court considered essentially the same question, but 
reached a diametrically opposite result in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,10 the first American 
case to squarely address the patenting of living organisms. The Chakrabarty decision 
concerned a patent application covering a genetically engineered microorganism capable 
of digesting petroleum. Most of the arguments on either side of the Chakrabarty decision 
paralleled those that either supported or opposed the patent in Harvard College. But most 
surprisingly, the courts in each case were interpreting the identical statutory language, 
because the subject matter provisions of the Canadian patent statute were lifted almost 
verbatim from the US statute. 
                                                          
9 Id. 
10 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
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As with the Canadian statute, the US patent statute also states as its subject matter 
new and useful processes, machines, articles of manufacture, and compositions of 
matter.11 But unlike the Canadian statute, the US understanding of these terms extends to 
living organisms. According to the US Supreme Court, the bacterium at issue in 
Chakrabarty, being composed of matter, clearly qualified as a composition of matter 
under the statute. The Court adopted the very straightforward position that bacteria, 
whatever their properties as organisms, are composed of matter, and that term as used in 
the statute includes technologies not specifically foreseen by the legislature. This 
conclusion was informed by a policy conclusion somewhat contrary to that of the 
Canadian court: that the US Congress in choosing the language of the statute had 
intended patentable subject matter to encompass “anything under the sun made by man,” 
consequently the language must be read expansively.12 On the American view, the 
subject matter categories might be viewed as illustrative, or at least broadly inclusive. 
In fact, unless one is possessed by the vitalism that seems to have gripped the 
Canadian Supreme Court in the Harvard College case, it is fairly difficult to identify 
items in the modern world that do not fit into one or more of the four categories of 
process, machine, composition of matter, or article of manufacture. For example, in 
addition to the Chakrabarty bacterium being a composition of matter, one could easily 
imagine drafting claims by which such a recombinant bacterium might also constitute an 
article of manufacture, given that it was the object of human processing, produced in a 
laboratory. Similarly, one might envision a creative set of claims under which the 
bacterium could be claimed as a machine—molecular biologists view various microbial 
                                                          
11 35 U.S.C. §101 (2011). 
12 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952)). 
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structures as molecular machines, including nanoscale electrical motors, flywheels, and 
driveshafts that drive bacterial flagella.13 Indeed, much of current nanotechnology is 
based on the mechanics of molecular assemblies originating in microorganisms. 
For that matter, claims to the Chakrabarty invention need not necessarily be 
confined to the “product” categories of machine, composition, or manufacture. One could 
imagine the bacterium being claimed in terms of its processes—although product patents 
and process patents are generally placed into separate categories, living organisms in fact 
constitute a discrete set of biological processes. On this view, Chakrabarty’s bacterium 
comprised a large bag of biochemical reactions, if you will, and could likely be 
distinguished in terms of such characteristics. It may be that as a practical matter such a 
characterization would be too onerous as a claims-drafting exercise. But the implication 
of such a thought exercise is that the Supreme Court’s reading of the statutory subject 
matter categories as illustrative and inclusive largely transforms the subject matter 
question into a descriptive problem. 
There is of course a critical policy consideration animating the US Supreme 
Court’s reading of the statute, which is a prescription remarkably different from the 
Canadian approach in Harvard College Each court read essentially identical language, 
and purported to defer to the legislative meaning of that language, to reach diametrically 
opposite defaults: in one case that the categories of subject matter were intended to be 
open to unforeseen innovation, in the other that the categories were intended to be closed. 
In other words, the US Supreme Court held that the door to new technologies was open 
unless Congress explicitly shuts it; the Canadian Supreme Court held that the door to new 
                                                          
13 See Jared Diamond, Transport Mechanisms: The Biology of the Wheel, 302 NATURE 572 (1983). 
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technologies is shut unless Parliament explicitly opens it.14 The implication for our 
analysis here is that the former position invites new readings of the subject matter 
categories, whereas the latter position precludes them. 
 
A. Describing Biotechnology Inventions 
But the Harvard College decision was short-lived, at least in its practical effect; within 
two years the Canadian Supreme Court negated its previous opinion, albeit without 
directly overruling it. In the subsequent Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser15 opinion, 
the subject matter restrictions of Harvard College were undermined and perhaps entirely 
undone, even though the particular holding of the opinion was retained. The Schmeiser 
case again concerned the patentability of a living, multicellular organism, this time in the 
form of a genetically modified plant. The plant in question was a patented recombinant 
canola plant that was resistant to the herbicide glyphosphate; the herbicide was marketed 
by Monsanto under the brand name “Round-Up,” making the plants “Round-Up Ready.” 
Monsanto alleged that a farmer, Percy Schmeiser, had been growing such “Round-Up 
Ready” plants without a license from Monsanto, in violation of the Monsanto patent. 
Schmeiser argued at trial that he was unaware of the presence of the patented 
plants in his fields, and did not know how they came to be growing there. It is fairly clear 
that neither the trial court nor subsequent appellate courts believed this assertion, finding 
contrary evidence that the plants were  in Schmeiser’s fields intentionally. Schmeiser’s 
level of intent or knowledge may have made little difference to the infringement analysis, 
as intentional or not, making using or selling a patented invention constitutes violation of 
                                                          
14 Burk, supra note 8, at 229. 
15 [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, 2004 SCC 34. 
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the patent statute as a matter of strict liability, and requires no scienter. So before the 
Canadian Supreme Court, Schmeiser argued that Monsanto’s patent could not be proper 
under the subject matter criteria articulated in the Harvard College case: the genetically 
modified plant was clearly a multicellular, “higher” organism with complexity equivalent 
to a genetically modified mouse. If the Canadian patent statute does not cover living 
organisms, so that it does not cover transgenic mice, surely it does not include transgenic 
plants either. 
The Court rejected this argument, albeit in a somewhat circuitous fashion. In the 
interim between Harvard College and Schmeiser, the Court had undergone a shift in 
personnel; the Schmeiser opinion was decided by a new majority, written by a Justice 
who had dissented in Harvard College, over the dissent of the Justice who had written the 
majority opinion in Harvard College. The Schmeiser majority, while acknowledging that 
the court had previously held higher organisms to be unpatentable, observed that the 
claims in the Monsanto patent were directed to a particular recombinant DNA sequence 
that conferred herbicide resistance. The Harvard College opinion had said nothing about 
the exclusion of DNA molecules from patentable subject matter. Thus the court reasoned 
that the Monsanto patent was not precluded by the Harvard College decision. 
By permitting the “Round Up Ready” plant to be patented as a practical matter by 
means of a claim to a constituent transgenic DNA sequence, the Schmeiser opinion 
avoided expressly overruling Harvard College but instead limited it to insignificance. 
True, the DNA claimed in the patent happened to be present in the plant, but it was not 
the plant itself that was claimed. This formalism propagates a version of the Chakrabarty 
description exercise above. After Schmeiser, clearly the path to patenting a plant, or a 
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mouse, or any other “higher” organism in Canada is to draft the claims in terms of the 
genetic modification, not in terms of the host embodying the modification. The Harvard 
College prohibition thus becomes no more than a prohibition on terminology. 
 
B. Expression and Function 
Crossing now over the Atlantic, the conceptual thread that begins with Harvard College 
takes on yet an additional twist in the more recent opinion of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in Monsanto v. Cefetra.16 This case concerned once again Monsanto’s 
herbicide resistance “Round-Up Ready” technology. However, this time the genetically 
modified plants were soy, rather than canola, and were grown in Argentina, a country 
where Monsanto held no patent on the herbicide-resistant plant.  
Patents are national in effect, and no patent owner holds patents to an invention in 
every possible jurisdiction. Because the transgenic soy beans at issue in the case had been 
grown in Argentina, no patent infringement occurred in the use of the plant there.  The 
beans were then ground into soymeal, which was imported into the European Union 
through Rotterdam. Monsanto did hold a Dutch “Round Up Ready” patent, but of course 
it was not the plant that was being imported: it was a processed product derived from the 
plant. 
However, as in the Schmeiser case, the Monsanto patent claims were drafted in 
terms of the recombinant DNA sequence. Monsanto asserted that the DNA sequence was 
present in the ground soymeal, so that importation of the meal constituted importation of 
the sequence, violating its patent. In particular, Monsanto argued that the patent was 
                                                          
16 Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Cefetra BV, 2010 E.C.R. 7. 
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drawn to protect the DNA sequences as such, not in meal or in a plant or any other 
particularized context. 
The importers alleged that this claim was improper under the European 
Biotechnology Directive, an EU requirement to which the patent law of member states—
including the Netherlands—must conform. Article 9 of the European Biotechnology 
Directive provides: 
The protection conferred by a patent on a product containing or consisting 
of genetic information shall extend to all material, save as provided in 
Article 5(1), in which the product is incorporated and in which the genetic 
information is contained and performs its function.17 
Recital 23 of the directive additionally provides that: 
. . . a mere DNA sequence without indication of a function does not 
contain any technical information and is therefore not a patentable 
invention.18 
Interpreting the Biotechnology Directive, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union rejected the assertion of the patent against the DNA in the soymeal. The Court 
took the inverse proposition of Article 9 as limiting biotechnology patents: protection 
shall not extend to material in which the genetic information does not perform its 
function. The DNA sequence, although present in the soymeal, was clearly not 
performing its function, as the material in which it was situated was dead. Even if the 
patent were properly read under Dutch law to cover the DNA sequence as found in the 
meal, this reading would conflict with the language of the Directive. 
                                                          
17 Directive 98/44/EG, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13 (EC). 
18 Id., pmbl. ¶ 23. 
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The opinion distinguishes between DNA as “genetic information” and as 
constituting “technical information,” which is to say, as enabling biological function. It 
seems clear the language in the Directive serves to deter naked claims to DNA, by linking 
molecular claims to a biological function.19 In the United States such claims have been 
similarly limited, under the utility requirement for patentability, by requiring disclosure 
of the biological function of the gene to which the patent is directed.20 Because the rate of 
discovery for DNA sequences far outpaces their characterization, absent such limitations, 
claims to isolated DNA molecules could be advanced long before their biological 
function is known, preempting later beneficial applications of the molecule. 
However, the Cefetra opinion extends this restriction to create a functional 
limitation on DNA product claims. This not only assumes that the biological function of 
the process is known and disclosed, it ties DNA product claims to a particular process 
implementation.21 By limiting DNA claims to a functional milieu, nucleotides become 
patentable only as part of a larger biological apparatus. This mirrors the rationale of 
decisions concerning software in the context of digital processing apparatus,22 a parallel 





                                                          
19 Andreas Hübel, General Issues of Biotech Patents, in BIOPATENT LAW: PATENT STRATEGIES AND 
PATENT MANAGEMENT 1, 10 (Ulrich Stolts ed., 2012). 
20 In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
21 See Sven J.R. Bostyn, A Decade after the Birth of the Biotech Directive: Was It Worth the Trouble?, in 
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND SOFTWARE LAW: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF NEW DEVELOPMENTS 221, 231 
(Emanuela Arezzo & Gustavo Ghidini eds., 2011). 
22 See Kambiz Fathi, Scope of Protection of Gene Patents in Europe, at 48 (University of Stockholm 
Master’s Thesis, Dec. 9, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=1970209 
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II. SUBJECT MATTER EXCLUSIONS 
As we have seen above, nearly everything “under the sun made by man,” if properly 
described, potentially fits into one or another of the American subject matter categories. 
This realization leaves one to wonder if there are items that, even if described so as to fit 
one or more of the statutory categories, are not “made by man” and so might be excluded 
from patentable subject matter. In fact patent law, both in Europe and America, deploys a 
series of doctrines intended to winnow out patent candidates that are not inventions by 
virtue of existing independent of, or perhaps prior to, human ingenuity. In the United 
States these doctrines have been primarily addressed in a series of cases dealing with the 
patentability of computer software.23 This developmental path may seem odd, given that 
computer technology seems clearly a product of human engineering, and other 
technologies such as biotechnology may seem drawn from natural materials. However, as 
process-based inventions, digital processors implement general principles in a manner 
that tends to implicate the division between the natural and the artificial. 
Additionally, such software decisions are tightly coupled to the biotechnology 
developments we have already explored. The relevant software cases begin with a trilogy 
of opinions from the US Supreme Court, beginning in the 1970s. These cases are 
contemporary with the Chakrabarty case, making their way through the US court system 
at approximately the same time that the Chakrabarty case was wending its way to the 
Supreme Court. Chakrabarty followed the first of the major software decisions, 
Gottschalk v. Benson,24 and was initially remanded back to an intermediate court of 
appeal for reconsideration in light of the second decision in the software trilogy, Parker 
                                                          
23 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 406 (2005). 
24 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
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v. Flook.25 The Chakrabarty opinion was in turn heavily relied upon in the subsequent 
decision on software in Diamond v. Diehr.26 Notwithstanding the different subject matter, 
Chakrabarty was effectively part of the same contemporaneous discourse as the 
Gottschalk, Flook, and Diehr decisions. 
The earliest of these Supreme Court decisions, the Gottschalk case, involved a 
method or “algorithm” for converting one type of numerical notation into a different type 
of numerical notation. The algorithm involved application of a particular mathematical 
procedure to convert the numerical notation; the court characterized patenting the 
algorithm as tantamount to patenting a mathematical procedure. As previous 
commentators have noted, Gottschalk lay at the confluence of several concatenated patent 
doctrines dealing with subject matter: the laws of nature doctrine, the abstract ideas 
doctrine, the mental steps doctrine, and the printed matter doctrine.27 Each of these 
closely related, judicially created doctrines serves to restrict the subject matter categories 
articulated in the statute. 
The first of these, figuring prominently in the opinion, is the prohibition against 
patenting laws or principles of nature. Among the possible exceptions to the very broad 
categories encompassed by the language of the American and Canadian patent statutes 
are items that exist independent of, or perhaps prior to human invention. If the Court in 
Chakrabarty held that anything under the sun made by man falls within patentable 
subject matter, this implies the inverse that items under the sun not made by man do not 
fall within patentable subject matter. Although there is no statutory language to this 
                                                          
25 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
26 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
27 See Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other 
Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025 (1992). 
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effect, the Court has at times held that laws and principles of nature, such as the theory of 
relativity, as well as naturally occurring items such as “a mineral discovered in the earth 
or a new plant found in the wild”28 constitute unpatentable products of nature. 
But this prohibition rests on the somewhat philosophically dubious proposition 
that what we label “natural law” originates, not from human invention or ingenuity, but 
as a feature of the material world, preceding human perception. The Gottschalk opinion 
equates mathematical procedures with laws of nature, extending the prohibition on 
patenting the latter to a prohibition on the former. One might of course question whether 
mathematics is in some sense constitutive of natural law, somehow embedded in the 
fabric of the universe, rather than constituting a human construct that is useful to describe 
the universe.29 And regardless of one’s view on the natural state of mathematics, one 
might question separately whether what we call natural law is not a product of human 
formulation. Nonetheless, US patent law since Gottschalk assumes that mathematics, as 
well as natural law, is somehow embedded in the fabric of the universe, waiting to be 
discovered, andis not invented. 
Acknowledging the laws of nature issue leads quickly to the second and related 
doctrine at issue in the case: the prohibition on patenting abstract ideas. Black-letter 
patent law has long prohibited the patenting of ideas that have not been reduced to some 
specific instantiation.30 The relationship to the principles of nature doctrine is almost 
immediately apparent: all patentable inventions are at some level based upon the 
operation of natural law or principles. A description of the invention at this abstract level 
frequently constitutes the idea or concept of the invention. Thus, claims that are not 
                                                          
28 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).  
29 See PHILLIP J. DAVIS & REUBEN HERSH, THE MATHEMATICAL EXPERIENCE 410 (1981). 
30 Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEXAS L. REV. 99, 137 (2000). 
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wedded to a fairly specific embodiment may be sufficiently imprecise to encompass the 
principle of the invention rather than its implementation, and so encompass laws of 
nature. 
The abstract idea prohibition in turn raises a third problem. Although perhaps not 
stated as explicitly as the other doctrines, the Gottschalk opinion indicated a concern with 
the mental steps doctrine.31 Patent law has long resisted claims encompassing steps that 
could be carried out in the human mind. To some extent, such claims simply raise 
practical problems of enforcement: if mental activity were covered by exclusive legal 
rights, it would be difficult to detect, police, assess, or prove infringement when someone 
is thinking patented thoughts. The very concept of exclusive rights in mental processes 
raises in turn related concerns regarding encroachment on freedom of speech and 
thought. Such concerns might not seem implicated by processes carried out in a digital 
computer. But to the extent that computers were in the 1970s and early 1980s viewed as 
“electronic brains,” some correspondence was seen between operations in carbon 
memory and operations in silicon memory. And, human cognitive processes might be 
implicated by broad undifferentiated claims including steps that could be carried out in 
either silicon or carbon memory, which is to say in a constructed data processor or in the 
human brain. 
Fourth, following from the mental steps doctrine is an inevitable concern 
regarding the “printed matter doctrine.”32 Patent law has tended to reject as unpatentable 
any claims where the novelty of the invention lies in the arrangement of symbolic indicia. 
As a practical matter, this prohibition helps to police the boundary between patent and 
                                                          
31 See Samuelson, supra note 27, at 1056–57. 
32 See Burk, supra note 30, at 141. 
18 
 
copyright, preventing patents on novel arrangements of symbols that constitute literary or 
artistic works. But symbolic indicia are of course largely constitutive of software: human-
readable indicia at the level of source code, machine-readable indicia at the level of 
object code. Software is inscribed in magnetic and optical media, and encoded in 
electronic circuits. The power of computing technology is that it is quite literally 
inscribed with writing, so that anything that can be described can be modeled in a data 
processor.33 Thus, patent claims involving software or recorded data tend to blur the line 
between function and expression; claims encompassing encoded functional operations 
could just as well read on recorded texts or music.34 
 
A. Tangible Inventions 
In a follow-on case, Parker v. Flook, the US Supreme Court held that software that was 
used to calculate the parameters for an industrial process was not patentable; a numerical 
“alarm limit” calculation, used to monitor the state of an industrial process, was held too 
abstract to meet the tests for subject matter.35 But the outcome was decidedly different in 
the third case the Court took during its twentieth-century run of software decisions, 
Diamond v. Diehr.36 This opinion, citing repeatedly to Chakrabarty, held that an 
industrial process for curing rubber was sufficiently concrete to garner a patent, even 
though the process involved the use of a chemical equation in a digital processor to 
perform calculations that determined the timing of the process. The difference between 
                                                          
33 Philip E. Agre, Internet Research: For and Against, in INTERNET RESEARCH ANNUAL: SELECTED PAPERS 
FROM THE ASSOCIATION OF INTERNET:RESEARCHERS CONFERENCES, 2000–2002, 25, 27 (Mia 
Consalvo et al. eds., 2004). 
34 See Burk, supra note 30, at 144–45. 
35 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
36 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
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Diehr and Flook appeared to rest largely on the palpability of the end product of the 
claimed process. In Flook it was a number, but in Diehr the output was a concrete, 
tangible, and useful result—that is, cured rubber. 
The approval of software claims grounded in “concrete” and “tangible” 
embodiments ushered in an era of what Professors Lemley and Cohen have called the 
“doctrine of the magic words.”37 For the next two decades, the Patent Office and lower 
courts in the United States struggled with the problem of when a claim constituted a 
claim to software, and when it constituted a Diehr-type claim to software 
implementation. Patent applicants and their attorneys drafted what were effectively 
software claims in terms of apparatus, engaging in much the same subject matter exercise 
illustrated above with regard to the Chakrabarty bacterium: How many statutory subject 
matter categories could claims for a software invention be drafted to fit? 
The most obvious characterization of software is of course the statutory category 
of process, as computer code implements a series of electromechanical transformations 
with a specified output. However, given that “algorithm” is very nearly synonymous with 
“process,” and Gottschalk largely disparaged the patenting of algorithms, the logical 
category for software became suspect. Diehr permitted claims to a type of algorithm, but 
seemingly only as embodied in mechanism, not pure process claims. But this of course 
points to a second statutory categorization; because the language of Diehr ostensibly 
valorized software in the context of apparatus claims, many software claims oriented 
toward characterization as a machine. 
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Thus a potential alternative was to claim software as a machine. As some 
commentators struggling with software in the copyright context have noted, software 
constitutes a machine built of text.38 But this is of course precisely the characteristic that 
runs afoul of the printed matter doctrine. Hence, machine-based claims were drafted in 
terms of the state of the hardware, as configured by software. In a similar vein, yet 
another alternative was to attempt to describe software as an article of manufacture: for 
example to claim semiconductor chips inscribed with novel code, or in the now-infamous 
patent application in In re Beauregard, to claim a floppy disc incorporating novel 
magnetic flux.39 After some resistance, the Patent Office grudgingly agreed to accept 
such claims, although it is worth noting that recent decisions have limited the use of such 
claims by examining the patentability of the underlying encoded process.40 
The overall consequence of the Gottschalk decision was that securing allowance 
of software claims became fundamentally a claims-drafting problem. Claims were 
couched in terminology either to obscure the presence of software entirely, or to describe 
it in a way palatable to the examiner’s degree of adherence to the cases interpreting the 
subject matter provisions. This trend reached its apex with the now-infamous Federal 
Circuit decision in State Street Bank, holding that any invention that produced a 
“concrete, tangible, useful result” fell within patentable subject matter41—but “concrete” 
and “tangible” appear to have been metaphors, as the Federal Circuit approved as 
concrete and tangible results such as numerical output, which was expressly disapproved 
by the Supreme Court in Gottschalk and Flook. 
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21 
 
And it is critical to note, with regard to composition of software patents, that 
several of the limiting doctrines identified in Gottschalk might themselves be viewed as 
inchoate products of indefinite claims drafting and inadequate disclosure. For example, 
one view of the prohibition against claiming laws of nature is that such claims violate the 
requirements of enablement, commensurability, and written description. The patentee 
cannot claim multiple instantiations of an invention unless she has enabled and described 
those instantiations, but claiming abstractions or principles of nature inevitably 
encompasses embodiments that are not enabled or described. Conversely, claims that are 
insufficiently imprecise might encompass the principle of an invention rather than its 
implementation, and so encompass laws of nature. Likewise, mental steps are almost by 
definition difficult to describe and enable. 
This view of descriptive inadequacy certainly was the position taken by the 
Federal Circuit in State Street, dealing with business methods.42 American patent 
jurisprudence has displayed a fairly strong historical bias against business method 
patents, many of which have traditionally involved mental steps or printed matter. 
Business methods became a recurring issue in software cases; once software patents are 
allowed, it is inevitable that some software will be directed to accounting or investment 
or inventory or other business methods. But the Federal Circuit opined that there was in 
fact no prohibition or animus against business methods; rather, that the cases disfavoring 
business methods had simply invalidated specific patents that failed enablement and 
claim definiteness—which happened to involve business methods. 
 
 




B. In Search of the Technical 
Such issues were of course not confined to the United States; software patents are sought 
in other jurisdictions as well. On the other side of the Atlantic, the European patent 
systems were confronting much the same set of problems.43 There has not been and is not 
at the time of this writing a pan-European patent; consequently a significant portion of 
this jurisprudence evolved in the context of diverse national court decisions.44 Those 
from Germany and the United Kingdom are particularly notable in their distinctive 
approaches to software as patentable subject matter.45 
Because a complete review of such decisions would exceed the limits imposed by 
this volume’s editors (and perhaps the patience of the audience, as well), I will focus here 
on decisions rendered by the appellate boards of the European Patent Office. The EPO is 
charged with examining applications under the provisions of the multilateral European 
Patent Convention (EPC). The EPC contains explicit treaty prohibitions addressing most 
of the judicially created doctrines at issue in Gottschalk. Article 52(2) of the EPC 
excludes from patentable subject matter: 
(a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; 
(b) aesthetic creations; 
(c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or 
doing business, and programs for computers; 
                                                          
43 See Justine Pila, Dispute Over the Meaning of the Word “Invention” in Article 52(2) EPC—The 
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44 See Rosa Maria Ballardini, Software Patents in Europe: The Technical Requirement Dilemma, 9 J. INT’L 
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(d) presentations of information.46 
On its face the provision might seem to end the question of patents for computer 
programs, as the treaty is explicit about excluding them from patentable subject matter. 
However, Article 52(3) adds a troubling caveat: that the enumerated categories are only 
excluded from patentable subject matter “as such.”47 This leaves the troubling question as 
to what could be meant by a computer program “as such”—that is, a computer program 
as a computer program and not as something else. 
Answering that question has produced, much as in the United States, two to three 
decades’ worth of uncertainty and turmoil over software patenting. The EPO has focused 
on whether an invention as claimed has some type of “technical” nature, which the 
Article 52 categories such as business methods and computer programs “as such” have 
been said to lack. Various tests have evolved to assay the technical character of 
suspicious claims. Initially the EPO looked for inventions to make a “technical 
contribution” to the art, that is, to have some inventive aspect outside the software.48 
Later this was amended to look for inventions having a “technical effect,” that is, some 
concrete output.49 More recently even this approach was abandoned to allow any claim 
involving hardware to come within patentable subject matter.50 
The parallels between these approaches and those in the contemporary 
Gottschalk/Flook/Diehr trilogy are apparent, as are the attendant pitfalls. As the suspect 
Article 52 categories frequently are implemented in computing apparatus, it becomes 
extremely difficult to determine when a computer program, business method, or even a 
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game has a technical character. The result has been the EPO’s version of the “doctrine of 
the magic words,” by which software patents passed the scrutiny of the examining corps 
so long as certain suspect terminology was avoided. The attempt to distinguish technical 
character has produced largely rhetorical stratagems: decades of patent applications 
concerning software, whose claims were drafted in terms of hardware or apparatus so that 
the claims would not be drawn to a computer program as a computer program. 
The issue is well bracketed by two decisions of the Technical Board of Appeal of 
the European Patent Office that concern business methods implemented in computer 
technologies. The first of these is the Pension Benefits decision, which considered an 
automated system of investment—that is to say, a business method.51 The claims of the 
patent were drawn to both the method of investment and an apparatus implementing the 
method. Reviewing the application, the Board opined that a technical character is 
inherent in the EPC concept of invention, and that merely reciting computing means 
within a method claim does not confer a technical character on a claimed process 
invention. At the same time, an apparatus claim to a suitably programmed data 
processing device would constitute patentable subject matter, rendering the claimed 
invention patentable subject matter. However the method claims in the patent were 
rejected as lacking a technical nature. 
A later decision, Hitachi,52 in some respects supports and in others contradicts the 
Pension Benefit outcome. The patent application in Hitachi claimed an automated system 
of auctioning; again, from a categorical perspective, the invention constituted both a 
computer program and a business method, and was described in an application 
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encompassing both apparatus and process claims. Following the Pension Benefits 
reasoning, the Board’s decision again held that the implementation of the invention in 
hardware, by virtue of incorporating the apparatus, clearly presented a claim with a 
technical nature. However, unlike the Pension Benefits decision, the Board held the 
method claims as executed by means of a physical apparatus to also entail a technical 
nature. 
Each of these decisions takes the position that by reciting an apparatus claim 
implementing the method, the method characterized as hardware comes within patentable 
subject matter, and no longer constitutes a program “as such.” This is essentially a 
version of the drafting techniques already discussed for the United States following 
Diamond v. Diehr. The opinions part ways with regard to the permissibility of method 
claims as method claims. But both cases then deny the applicant a patent for failure of an 
inventive step, holding that given the invention, implementation in a general purpose data 
processor is obvious. 
This approach is logically somewhat suspect due to what American courts would 
term “hindsight reconstruction”; that is, taking the invention as given when assessing its 
own inventiveness. Such an approach comes very close to the discredited analysis of 
Parker v. Flook, which considered an abstract method as its implementation’s own prior 
art.53 But notwithstanding the questionable logic of the inventive step analysis, the overall 
outcome of the cases may chart the most pragmatic and productive route for questions 
involving problematic technologies. Rather than struggle with intractable subject matter 
questions, the decisions concede that interminable, unwinnable fight; grant the method 
                                                          




patentable subject matter status; and instead hold firm on the patentability questions of 
utility, novelty, and obviousness. This approach was unfortunately rejected by the US 
Supreme Court when recently urged by the Obama administration as a sensible resolution 
to subject matter confusion.54 But the EPO decisions may chart a path to a more sensible 
subject matter jurisprudence. 
Or perhaps they will not. It is worth noting that the President of the EPO, perhaps 
in response to the invitation of a British court attempting to fathom the EPO case 
decisions,55 convened an enlarged Board to reconcile the disparity between the approach 
typified by Hitachi and that typified by Pension Benefits.56 After spending considerable 
time with the problem, the Board declined to do so, issuing an opinion that some 
variation was inevitable in developing technologies. Given that the technology, and the 
problems associated with claiming, have been developing for a good thirty years, it is 
difficult to understand how much more development is needed before a coherent 
approach could be articulated. 
 
III. PROCESS AND APPARATUS 
The subject matter themes found in biotechnology and software cases converge in a 
series of recent disputes over patents for diagnostic tests. These cases combine the 
recurring questions we have seen regarding principles of nature, mental steps, abstract 
ideas, and subject matter categories. Although these process inventions frequently 
involve some biological molecule, sometimes including DNA or another nucleic acid, 
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and may be automated, employing some type of digital processor, the doctrinal 
convergence is due to more than a technological convergence. The method claims at issue 
in such cases involve biological rather than electronic processes, but implicate the same 
set of doctrines and policies. 
The commonality is largely a product of the form of the claims at issue more than 
of the particular technology involved. The most troublesome diagnostic claims have been 
directed to minimalist versions of test procedures, seemingly relatively low-tech 
processes centered on drawing a biological sample and performing simple chemical 
analysis, possibly by hand. Rather than reciting a specific apparatus they claim the steps 
of testing and diagnosis simpliciter. Consequently, as in the software controversy over 
mental steps, these claims do not distinguish whether the procedure is to be performed in 
silicon or carbon data processors, and they are concomitantly broad enough to encompass 
the idea or principle on which the test is based. 
Claims of this type were at issue in Labcorp v. Metabolite,57 where the diagnostic 
process claims at issue involved a “correlation” step—that is, testing for the presence of a 
certain substance in the blood of a patient, and deciding on the basis of the concentration 
of that substance whether the patient was ill. This case was originally accepted for review 
by the US Supreme Court, then dismissed as having been improvidently granted review.58 
Justice Breyer, dissenting from the dismissal order, indicated in a lengthy opinion his 
discomfort with such patents as possibly encompassing laws of nature—that is, the 
relationship between a certain metabolite and disease—and possibly encompassing a 
                                                          




“mental step” in the doctor’s recognition of disease from a test result.59 Breyer urged 
review of the case or a similar case in order to reign in subject matter overreaching. 
Breyer’s commentary signaled to lower courts the likelihood of Supreme Court action on 
the topic, and is widely credited with moving the inferior Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit away from its permissive “useful concrete tangible result” test for 
patentability. 
Nonetheless, similar patents continued to issue, and the Supreme Court took up 
this series of questions in the Mayo v. Prometheus60 decision, another diagnostic method 
case. The method claims in the patent held by Prometheus were drawn to the process of 
measuring the levels of certain metabolites in a patient’s blood after administering 
thiopurine drugs, and then adjusting the dosage to avoid either an ineffectively low or 
harmfully high dosage. As in Metabolite, the patent was challenged on the ground that its 
claims were essentially drawn to laws of nature, that is, to the relationship between the 
level of metabolites in the patient’s blood and the efficacy of the drug dosage. 
Additionally, also as in Metabolite, the claims included a “determining” step that could 
have been characterized as an impermissible mental step. 
The court focused on the “principle of nature” argument, relying on the reasoning 
from the Diehr and Flook software decisions to emphasize that processes consisting 
largely or entirely of physical correlations, without some significant physical apparatus or 
application, lie outside patentable subject matter. The Federal Circuit had opined that the 
claims met this standard because they involved a “transformation” of matter in vivo, 
which is to say that the drug administered to the patient metabolized in the body to the 
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substances measured. But the Supreme Court viewed metabolic transformation itself as 
merely the product of natural biological processes, and inconsequential in limiting claims 
to the process of gathering data from which physicians could draw an inference about the 
patient’s treatment. The Court particularly emphasized that broad method claims of this 
type could preclude use of the underlying principle, potentially inhibiting future research 
or advancement based on the principle. 
The commonalities between the software cases and the diagnostic cases are not 
limited to the appearance of the laws of nature or mental steps doctrines. The printed 
matter doctrine has reared its head in the diagnostic cases as well, as for example in the 
King Pharmaceuticals v. Eon Labs61 decision from the Federal Circuit. The claims in the 
contested King patent concerned a method of administering a pharmaceutical orally with 
food, which was shown to increase the efficacy of the drug. There was nothing new about 
the drug or its use in treatment, or oral administration. For that matter, people had long 
taken the drug with food, but had done so to avoid an upset stomach, rather than to 
increase the efficacy of the drug. The only new aspect of the method was informing or 
encouraging the patient to take the drug with food for enhanced efficacy. Thus, the claims 
of the method of treatment patent at issue were drawn to either verbally informing the 
patient of the positive effects of administering the drug with food, or communicating this 
information to the patient by means of a printed label on the drug container. 
The most recent chapter in this ongoing story is found in the American court 
decisions involving the so-called Myriad gene patents, Association for Molecular 
Pathology v. United States Patent and Trademark Office,62 a case that as of this writing is 
                                                          
61 616 F.3d 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
62 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent &Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
30 
 
pending before the US Supreme Court.63 The lawsuit is contemporary with the Bilski, 
Prometheus, and King lawsuits, moving through the court system in parallel with those 
decisions. The AMP lawsuit concerns claims to genetic sequences, and to diagnostic 
procedures employing the gene sequences, for BRCA-1 and BRCA-2, which confer on 
carriers of the genes a heightened risk of breast cancer.64 Both the product patent claims 
directed to the nucleotides and the process patent claims directed to using the sequences 
were challenged as encompassing unpatentable laws or products of nature.65 
The Myriad product claims included different types of molecules with different 
relationships to naturally occurring DNA. The patent claimed both “isolated and purified” 
genomic (gDNA) sequences, as well as complementary (cDNA) sequences, that are 
reverse transcribed from messenger RNA (mRNA) transcripts drawn from human cells. 
The genomic sequences were a particular target of the “products of nature” argument, as 
their nucleotide sequences were drawn from those found in the human body. However, 
relying on several decades of precedential practice from the USPTO, Myriad argued that 
the limitation in the claim to “isolated and purified” sequences set them apart from 
naturally occurring DNA. The DNA sequences as found in human somatic cells are 
surrounded by and bound to an array of other macromolecules, making the isolated 
sequence a product of human intervention that is not naturally occurring. 
Myriad further argued that, even if the claims to isolated genomic DNA read on 
products of nature, the patent claims to cDNA did not. cDNA does not normally exist in 
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human cells, being the product of a laboratory reverse transcription procedure using 
mRNA transcripts as a template, read by a special type of viral enzyme that will assemble 
a DNA strand complementary to the RNA.66 As a result, cDNAs typically have structural 
and coding differences from genomic human DNA; in particular, they are missing long 
“intervening sequences” or “introns” that are not transcribed into mRNA, and so are not 
present in the reverse transcribed cDNA.67 Transcription from RNA to DNA does not 
normally occur in human cells, so that the claimed cDNAs were fairly clearly the product 
of human intervention. 
However the trial court held both types of DNA molecules, cDNA and gDNA, 
unpatentable, reasoning that they contained the same “information” as a native DNA 
strand, which is to say that they contained essentially the same coding sequence.68 As the 
“physical embodiment of genetic information,” the trial judge found them to constitute 
products of nature rather than products of human invention. The court additionally held 
Myriad’s process claims, drawn to the use of the genes in diagnosis, to be unpatentable 
on much the same grounds as the Supreme Court later articulated for invalidating the 
Prometheus diagnostic claims. The process claims recited a method for assessing the 
relationship of particular nucleotide sequences to the risk of breast cancer, without 
specifying any particular apparatus or embodiment. This, the court reasoned was 
tantamount to patenting a natural principle: the correlation between the presence of 
certain DNA variants in the body, and the risk of developing breast cancer.69 
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On appeal to the Federal Circuit, and again subsequently on remand to the Federal 
Circuit from a brief sojourn at the Supreme Court, a three-judge panel unanimously 
upheld the trial judge’s holdings with regard to the Myriad diagnostic claims, 
unanimously reversed the trial judge’s holding regarding cDNA, and reversed by a 
majority the holding regarding gDNA.70 The panel all agreed that the process claims 
encompassed abstract laws of nature, and all agreed that cDNAs are the patentable 
product of human intervention, but split regarding the “product of nature” claims for 
gDNA. 
In fact, even the majority of the panel was in many senses a plurality, reflecting a 
three-way division of opinion as to how to think about the genomic DNA claims. Judge 
Bryson, in dissent, fully embraced the trial court’s characterization of the genomic 
sequence DNA as an unpatentable natural product.71 Judge Lourie, writing for the 
majority, reached his conclusions by focusing primarily on the structure of the gDNA 
molecules, noting that the nucleotide chains, having been separated from their native 
environment of the chromosome, have a different chemical structure than the same 
sequences as found in human cells.72 Judge Moore, in concurrence, reached the same 
conclusions, but by focusing primarily on the function of the gDNA, noting that the 
DNAs claimed in the patent could be used for a variety of purposes that a native molecule 
could not.73 
The interplay between the district and appellate courts in AMP echoes and 
reprises certain themes recognizable from the computer software cases. Aside from the 
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familiar “principle of nature” treatment of the diagnostic method claims, much of the 
discussion hinges on the proper categorical treatment of information-based inventions. 
Indeed, the discourse among the appellate judges, and between the appellate and trial 
judges, can be seen as a disagreement over “technical character” in a different context. 
Although the appellate decision is divided on the question of gDNA patentability, its 
unanimity on the question of cDNA was tantamount to a unanimous rejection of the trial 
court’s equation of cDNA and gDNA as equivalently entailing the same informational 
content. And with regard to the patentability of gDNA, one might say that the appellate 
majority largely focused on the apparatus, that is, on either the structure or the function of 
the molecule, rather than on its coding sequence. 
 
CONCLUSION 
It is impossible to trace the trajectory of these cases without being struck by the multiple 
intricate cross-connections. The issues raised by biotechnology and software patenting 
cross both technological and jurisdictional boundaries. It may come as something of a 
surprise that Gottschalk and Diehr can only be properly read in the context of 
Chakrabarty, or that Hitachi and Pension Benefits are best understood in tandem with 
Monsanto v. Cefetra. But what may be more surprising is that full comprehension of the 
ramifications of the Cefetra decision requires the context provided by AMP and 
Schmeiser, or that the reasoning of Hitachi and Pension Benefits tracks both Gottschalk 
and AMP. 
Reading such cases together demonstrates the recurrent doctrinal pattern in both 
biotechnology and software subject matter decisions. First, in comparing the cases 
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reviewed here, it should be apparent that the doctrines invoked in such cases—laws of 
nature, abstract ideas, mental steps, printed matter—not only substantially overlap with 
one another but are frequently indistinguishable from one another, blurring across a 
doctrinal gradient: patent claims that are too abstract run the risk of capturing within their 
ambit a law of nature; claims that encompass mental steps are too abstract; claims that 
encompass symbolic indicia may read on mental steps. Hence these doctrines travel in a 
pack, appearing en masse in the patent decisions addressing biotechnology and software. 
The effect of these doctrines, as shown above, is to transform the subject matter problem 
in biotechnology and software patents into a drafting problem. Language that seems 
sufficiently concrete, avoiding abstractions or conceptual claiming, will tend to skirt the 
around the limiting doctrines. Conversely, the prohibitions against software or 
biotechnology in certain forms shunt claims drafting toward descriptions that encompass 
familiar and permissible statutory categories (machines, articles of manufacture, 
compositions of matter), and away from process-based claims.  These acceptable 
categories are all product categories, and so necessarily tied to a particular physical 
substrate. And of course process claims, being largely conceptual, are most acceptable 
when described in terms of some physical apparatus. 
The appearance of these doctrinal patterns in contexts that cross technological and 
jurisdictional boundaries allows us to observe not merely doctrinal similarities, but to 
excavate the underpinnings of such similarities. A key insight is the presence of 
informational claims, as acknowledged in cases such as AMP and Cefetra.74 At some 
level all technology involves the embodiment of information; to a greater or lesser extent 
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all artifacts carry information encoded in technical structures.75 This is sometimes easily 
apparent, as in the case of a mechanical lock and key, and sometimes less apparent. Even 
artifacts whose informational encoding is not immediately recognizable entail 
informational content, as thermodynamically defined.76 
But where classic mechanical, electrical, or chemical inventions were concerned, 
this aspect of their character could largely be ignored or overlooked. Indeed, because 
description and specification of informational content is relatively recent and often 
imprecise, patent law proceeding out of the nineteenth century developed an antipathy 
toward informational characterizations, leaning instead toward definition of inventive 
artifacts in terms of more readily observable physical attributes.77 We have seen in the 
reviewed cases above this tropism, across subject matter categories, toward definition by 
means of physical characteristics. 
However, the informational character of process-based inventions is less 
amenable to being ignored than that of product inventions. Processes, whether chemical, 
mechanical, or electrical, necessarily implicate the transfer of information, as entropic 
changes between physical vectors.78 Little wonder, then, that processes become suspect 
subject matter for patents unless limited to the objects or subjects of such transfer. And 
this antipathy extends to information-based technologies generally. As I have pointed out 
in previous work, informational encoding is eminent in both macromolecules and 
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computer devices, where informational content is only lightly embodied, and the 
descriptive line between product and process is blurred.79 
In sum, all the doctrines common to trans-Atlantic software and biotechnology 
cases concern the disposition of information within patentable subject matter. Broad 
abstract claims constitute claims to information or information transfer; mental steps 
implicate the organic recording of information, just as printed matter necessarily 
implicates the codification of information. Patent doctrine attempts to confine software 
claims to a particular apparatus for data processing, or limit a DNA claim to the context 
of a particular function, in an attempt to avoid the hard question of how to situate these 
information technologies within a nineteenth-century legal framework. The cases 
deploying these doctrines, in any jurisdiction, are difficult to parse, but the deficiency lies 
not in the “problem” technologies they address. Rather the problem is in the capacity of 
patent law to function in the information age. Until patent law develops some way to 
accommodate information-based technologies, courts on both sides of the Atlantic will 
continue to struggle to apply subject matter limitations. 
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